thing, Pendleton Jimenez wants to become the mother she has lost. In both texts, mothering is not just about the producing a child but an experience which brings context and meaning to one's own life and body. Both authors use their journey to motherhood as an occasion to reflect on their social position and identity. Pendleton Jimenez presents the experience as an opportunity to dwell in one's own identity. The author grounds the work in reflection and analysis of her own identity.
The book is accessible for the lay reader but would be a useful teaching resource that explores and complicates the journey to motherhood. The author paints an honest, raw picture that subtlety disrupts the taken-for-granted assumptions that there is a certain type of person who mothers, a certain type of person who hungers for a baby, and a specific path to conceiving and growing a baby. While this is certainly a relevant and timely text, I would have liked to see the author discuss more deeply the concepts of privilege that influence who is able to engage in such a journey of conception. In Our Bodies, Whose Property?, Anne Phillips considers the implications to framing bodies with property rhetoric. Though chapter topics seem disparate, they all involve bodies made available in market spaces for rent or sale. The author operates according to the premise that bodies remind "us of our shared vulnerability," (11) but property discourses isolate persons and bracket out our mutual vulnerabilities. Phillips's first chapter overviews theories of the body, including Ronald Dworkin's consideration of the prophylactic line "that comes close to making the body inviolate" (39) by marking bodies for self-ownership. This boundary-line of skin binds and separates bodies from one another, and circumscribes the entitlements persons have to bodily control. The ideal of personal ownership so entrenched in theory-work-even of the feminist variety-carries the presumption that the self is not the body, in other words, that the body is the stuff that the self possesses. Phillips reviews the history of body theory in order to highlight the ways in which "metaphors of property encourage fantasies of the person as separable from her capacities and the self as separable from her body" (37).
In the chapters that follow, she reviews the application of property language to sexual assault and organ trade. The author spends chapter three considering the sale of reproductive services, specifically surrogacy. She confronts the discomfort around framing the phenomenon as a property matter: "the commercialism of surrogacy brings with it-requires of its participants-a distancing and disembodiment" (90). She concludes that compensation is actually fair in surrogacy contracts, as long as compensation is not market-based, and that the trouble with surrogacy arrangements is not so much the pay, but that the strict nature of some contracts constrains women's bodies and reproductive decisions.
In her closing remarks, the author seeks to disentangle the positive aspects of our bodies belonging to us from the more problematic connotations to body ownership, because property paradigms constrain our range of relevant political and personal considerations. The language of property rights applied to the body "locates [the significance of body issues] firmly within the individual" (139), and "drags us back to ideas of something vested in us before society took hold" (135). Our metaphors limit us by naturalizing liberal conceptualizations of self-that which has a body, rather than is embodied. In so doing they constrain how we discuss and critique what happens to bodies in market spaces: our metaphors justify ways in which bodies may be sold or rented, taken by force or even given by choice.
Phillips's work functions as a critique of liberal ideologies that prioritize the autonomous subject, framed by body boundaries that divide self from others. This sort of critique is feminist, though it can be distinguished from more liberal feminist traditions. The very title of her work seems to serve as a response to the famous book Our Bodies, Ourselves (The Boston Women's Health Book Collective 1), originally published in the 1970s to provide information on female health, specifically reproduction and sexuality. This book was a flag-post in the history of feminist theory and activism, and yet the language and tone of the work indicated that the body could be owned, as long as the right people were in possession of it. This sort of assumption may have reinforced that prophylactic line, and thus disregarded the material inequalities that exist between persons, that shape subjectivities, and that inform decisions about body use.
In contrast, Our Bodies, Whose Property? is grounded in more recent femi-volume 5, number 2 nist scholarship that has sought to critique models of autonomous subjectivity (Mackenzie and Stoljar 11) . These models have been challenged for their entanglements with "a larger North American cultural ideal of competitive individualism" (Sherwin 34) . That is, the rugged individual is borne out of, not logically prior to, cultural paradigms that cannot capture the inter-corporeal and inter-relational aspects to human living. Phillips is contributing to discourses that seek to move feminisms forward, that seek to build nuance into our demands for bodily control. For, even when calling for reform, feminist scholars and activists may be mired in the paradigms of self-ownership that force us into argumentative circles when confronted with scenarios where women might choose to rent themselves out. This book pulls us out of these argumentative ruts by noting how our language has been leading us astray.
